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Application of California's Constitutional




For over eleven years, tenants in The Golden Gateway Center, a
large private apartment complex in downtown San Francisco,
communicated with each other and their tenants association via
newsletters and other leaflets.1 When the building management changed,
it attempted to stop this free exchange.2 It is well-understood that the
California Constitution allows free speech on certain types of private
property, as explained in the famous Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping
Center opinion. Until Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Ass'n, however, the state supreme court had not been called
upon to decide whether tenants had a state constitutional right to
communicate with each other on the property they had a contractual and
property right to possess. Over twenty years after Robins, the court
attempted to clarify that decision, searching for a brighter line to define
where the rights of a private property owner end and the state
constitutional right to free expression begins.
The first of three cases accepted for review in 2000-2001 in this
area,4 Golden Gateway resulted in a plurality decision that has provided
* J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003; B.A. Oregon State
University. I would like to thank Dean Preston, Professor Joseph R. Grodin, Professor Richard
Cunningham, Suzanne K. Babb, Angela Gaylord, Michael Stonebreaker, and the enormously helpful
attorneys who were involved in the Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n case:
Robert DeVries; Scott A. Kronland, Alschuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, Rubin & Demain; Susan M.
Popik, Chapman, Popik & White; James A. Judge, Law Offices of Van Gemert & Judge; Glenn P.
Zwang, Bartko, Zankel, Tarrant & Miller; Harold E. Johnson, Pacific Legal Foundation; and Jo Anne
Bernhard.
1. Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
2. Id. at 799-800.
3. 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 74 (1980).
4. Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 989 P.2d 645 (1999) (grant of
review); Young v. Raley's, Inc., 29 P.3d 795 (2001) (grant of review); Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive
Campaigns, 19 P.3d 1128 (2001) (grant of review).
[1745]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
only a modicum of needed clarity in applying state constitutional free
speech principles to a general non-retail setting. While the facts at issue
in the case presented an opportunity to clarify Robins, three justices
would have imposed a state action requirement, the chief justice declined
to reach a state action analysis, and three justices applied Robins, finding
no compelling reason to depart from its balancing test. The interplay
between the concurrence and the lead opinion succeeded in slightly
narrowing the Robins balancing test, but has not quelled the private
property/free expression debate.
Part I of this Note reviews the case background leading up to
Golden Gateway. Part II examines the analyses set forth in the lead,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the post-Golden
Gateway standard and lower court decisions applying Golden Gateway.
Part IV discusses how neither state action, nor the existing balancing
approach, is the appropriate measuring stick for state constitutional free
speech rights. This Note proposes a new two-tiered standard. First, state
constitutional speech protections should extend state constitutional
protections for freedom of expression to those with a legally enforceable
right to be present on the private property in question. Second, where
no legally enforceable right exists, this Note advocates a narrower,
clearer balancing approach than was originally enunciated in Robins.
I. Background
On March 30, 1979, the California Supreme Court decided the
seminal free speech case Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center.7 In
Robins, students in a large suburban shopping center were soliciting
signatures on a statement to be sent to the President of the United States
that protested a United Nations resolution against Zionism. The
management of the privately-owned shopping center informed the
students that their solicitation was against shopping center rules and
requested the students leave the premises.9 The students complied but
later filed suit, claiming their constitutionally guaranteed free speech
rights had been denied. The California Supreme Court found that the
California Constitution afforded broader free speech protections than
the United States Constitution." The court reasoned that, as seen under
zoning laws and other types of prevailing governmental concerns, the
rights of private property owners must yield to the countervailing public
interest.' According to the court, the right to free speech was seen as
equally important to the government's right to regulate public property
5. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d 797.
6. Id.
7. Robins, 592 P.2d at 341.
8. Id. at 342.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 343.
12. Id. at 344.
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under recognized police power to protect "health and safety, the
environment, aesthetics, property values and other societal goals that
have been held to justify reasonable restrictions of private property
rights. 1 3  However, the bulk of the opinion was fact-specific to the
shopping center setting. 4 Because the public was invited to be on the
premises for a variety of activities, and statistical evidence showed that
large shopping centers had replaced traditional central business districts
in suburban settings, free speech must be protected in large shopping
centers even when they are privately owned.
Under the Robins standard, California courts applied an ad hoc
balancing test to determine when free speech trumps the rights of private
property owners. Under the standard, "courts are required to consider
the nature of the facility and weigh the competing interests of the public
and the property owner. Only when the public's interest in free
expression outweighs the owner's interest in controlling access to the
property is expressive activity permitted.' 6 The court must "balance
free speech rights against the competing property, privacy, and
autonomy interests asserted by the property owner [using] ad hoc
multifactor analysis weighing the specific variables in each case .... ,,"'
The Robins court did expressly note that the exercise of free speech on
private property must be done reasonably, subject to time, place and
manner restrictions.
Since Robins, a number of free speech cases have come to the state
appellate courts mainly in two areas-protesting at reproductive health
service providers and soliciting signatures at stand-alone retail
establishments.
Allred v. Harris,'9 Allred v. Shawley'° and Planned Parenthood v.
Wilson2' each involved pro-life demonstrators in the parking lots of
medical office complexes which housed family planning clinics. In each
case the courts "concluded the private parking areas of a medical facility
were not the equivalent of a traditional public forum and therefore
individuals did not have a constitutional right of access to the property
for the purpose of [free speech] activity.,
22
Similarly, in Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns," persons
were attempting to collect signatures for a petition outside of a stand-
13. Id. at 346.
14. Id. at 346-48.
15. Id.
16. Costco Co. v. Gallant, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 349 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted).
17. See Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting Free Speech
Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property of Private Medical Clinics Providing Abortion
Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1114 (1991) [hereinafter Pruning Pruneyard].
18. Robins, 592 P.2d at 347.
19. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (Ct. App. 1993).
20. 284 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Ct. App. 1991).
21. 286 Cal. Rptr. 427 (Ct. App. 1991).
22. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 534.
23. 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Ct. App. 1999).
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alone grocery store. In Bank of Stockton v. Church of Soldiers of the
Cross of Christ,4 a religious organization sought donations outside of a
bank. As in the medical center cases, the courts held that a stand-alone
retail outlet was not analogous to a multi-use shopping center." These
locations were more like a modest retail establishment than a large
shopping center or public forum." No compelling societal interest in
exercising free speech in that location would override the store's or the
bank's interest in exercising exclusive control over its property.27 The
public came for a single purpose and did not congregate freely,
2
8
therefore, the property owner could limit the use of its property.
Despite the consistency of the appellate court decisions in applying
Robins, large gray areas existed between what property is clearly private,
as in the medical center context, what is quasi-private, as in stand-alone
retail outlets, and what is private but has a public character, as in a large
shopping center. While it became apparent that the California
Constitution extended the rights of the public to exercise free speech on
some private property, exactly how to apply Robins to non-shopping
center situations was still unclear.0
II. Golden Gateway
Unlike any of the preceding cases, which involved private property
with some level of public access, Golden Gateway involved a private
urban residential apartment building.31 Instead of the public wishing to
exercise constitutionally guaranteed speech rights on private property, it
was residential tenants who wished to speak. In this atypical situation,
the court failed to find consensus.
A. Factual Background
The Golden Gateway Center apartment complex (the "Complex")
was comprised of four high-rise apartment buildings in downtown San
Francisco that contained 1,254 residences. 2 Although the ground floor
housed retail establishments, there was no direct access from this area to
the private, residential portions of the buildings.33 Each tenant signed a
lease, which included the tenant's agreement to comply with building
standards.34 The building standards strictly prohibited solicitation. The
24. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429 (Ct. App. 1996).
25. Trader Joe's Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; Bank of Stockton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
26. Trader Joe's Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; Bank of Stockton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
27. Trader Joe's Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; Bank of Stockton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
28. Trader Joe's Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; Bank of Stockton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
29. Trader Joe's Co., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449; Bank of Stockton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 434.
30. See Pruning Pruneyard, supra note 17, at 1092.






apartment buildings were open only to tenants and their guests.36 The
Complex provided doormen and twenty-four-hour security patrols."
The Golden Gateway Tenants' Association (the "GGTA") was a
private association that began distributing leaflets under and around the
doors of the apartment tenants in the early 1980s."8 In 1993 the Golden
Gateway Center, Inc. (the "Owner") asked the GGTA to cease
distribution of its materials under the apartment doors.39 The GGTA
cited their constitutional right to free speech and threatened litigation. 4
Management sought to avoid litigation and agreed that the leafleting
could continue so long as it was done in a "reasonable manner," though
"reasonable" was not defined at that time.4 ' The GGTA continued to
distribute its materials.42 In 1995 the Owner changed management
companies and in 1996 the GGTA sharply increased its leafleting
activity.43  This led the Owner to revise its building standards,
incorporated by reference into each tenant's lease agreement.4  The
revised standards prohibited anyone from placing materials under and
around doorways, in elevators and hallways, unless a tenant specifically
asked to have the materials delivered to them.4 '5 Again, GGTA refused
to alter its distribution.46 The Owner initially obtained injunctive relief,
but the trial court ultimately found that the Owner's management and
the GGTA had entered into a binding verbal agreement to allow the
GGTA to continue47 distributing leaflets so long as it was done in a
reasonable manner. The Owner appealed and the appellate court
reversed, finding that the tenants, by virtue of their lease agreement had
contractually agreed to abide by the building standards and that there
was no binding agreement between the building owners and the tenants'
association modifying the building standards to allow leafleting.45 It also
held that the GGTA had no federal or state constitutional free speech
right to leaflet in the building. 49 The GGTA then appealed to the
California Supreme Court. 0 Review was granted by the California









44. Id. at 800.
45. Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 3, Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (No. S081900).





August 2003] GOLDEN GA TEWA Y
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
(1) whether the tenants association of a large apartment complex has
the right, under the California Constitution, to distribute its newsletter
and other leaflets concerning residence in the complex to tenants in the
building; and, if so, (2) whether a ban on the distribution of these
materials to tenants constitutes an unreasonable time, place and
manner restriction on free speech.5
B. The Lead Opinion
Justice Brown, joined by Justices Baxter and Chin, recognized the
legal scholarship that had expressed concern and frustration in applying
the Robins balancing test to situations outside of the shopping center
setting. The Robins opinion "did not address the threshold issue of
whether California's free speech clause protects against only state action
or also against private conduct."53  These three justices took this
opportunity to clarify the limits of Robins and attempt to articulate a
more universal legal test.
The lead opinion intimated that Robins might have been decided
differently today, but that the underlying frustration with the inadequacy
of the Robins analysis had to give way to stare decisis.14 The justices
recognized that, despite its ambiguities, "Robins is embedded in our free
speech jurisprudence with no apparent ill effects" and there was no
special justification for departing from it.55 Although Robins is ingrained
in California case law, whether Robins required a threshold finding of
"state action" before applying state constitutional protections needed to
be clarified.
The lead opinion began its analysis by first looking to the plain
language of article 1, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California
Constitution. That section provides that "[e]very person may freely
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge
liberty of speech or press. "" The plain language, they asserted, supports
"either the presence or absence of a state action limitation."5
By specifically including that "a law" shall not impair free speech in
the second sentence, were the framers referring back to the first sentence
or specifically delineating a second way of protecting free speech, this
time from the legislature? Because they found the plain language could
support either conclusion, the court looked to the legislative history."
Unfortunately, history of the development and adoption of the state
constitution shows "the framers borrowed from the free speech clause of
51. Id.
52. See id. at 801-02.
53. Id. at 801.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 803.
56. Id. at 801.
57. Id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2. subd. (a)).
58. Id. at 804 (emphasis omitted).
59. See id. at 804-06.
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the New York Constitution... virtually unchanged and with no
debate., 60  The core text of the provision likewise has not changed
through several revisions of the state constitution. Therefore the
opinion looked to the New York legislative history and the works of
constitutional scholars.62
History reveals that the framers of the New York Constitution were
more concerned about governmental interference with the exercise of
free speech than with private actors.6 Scholarly works on the New York
Constitution echoed this conclusion. The New York Reports of
Proceeding recorded one delegate stating that the free speech provision
is not "enumerating the rights of the people, but restricting the power of
the legislature." 64 Thus, the lead opinion argued that the New York
legislature intended to protect free speech only as against state actors.65
Since the California delegates adopted the provision verbatim with little
discussion, the lead opinion assumed that the framers of the California
Constitution held the same intent.66 The justices also noted that a
number of California constitutional scholars have reached the same
conclusion: The California Constitution of 1849 was more a limitation on
61the power of the legislature, not as much a grant of authority.
Therefore the free speech clause was intended to protect the "liberties of
Californians from governmental encroachment.'"
The lead opinion also looked atyprior jurisprudence in interpreting
other state constitutional provisions. Other sections of the California
Constitution have been construed by the courts as having a state action
requirement even though the face of the clause does not expressly state
such a requirement.70 Article 1, section 7 of the California Constitution,
California's equal protection provision, and article 1, section 13, the
search and seizure provision, have both been construed to contain state
action limitations.7 However, the cases on which the lead opinion relied
for this assertion do not directly support their argument." In Gay Law
Students Ass'n v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., the California
Supreme Court stated that prior jurisprudence of both state and federal
equal protection clauses "clearly prohibit the state or any governmental
entity from arbitrarily discriminating against any class of individuals in
60. Id. at 804.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 805-06.
63. Id. at 805.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 805-06.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 806.
68. Id. (citing GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 21 (1993)) (emphasis
omitted).





employment decisions."73  This case does little to support the lead
opinion's position that a constitutional provision need not require state
action on its face to make it enforceable only against governmental
entities. The defendant, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, was granted a
utility monopoly by the state and was deemed by the court to be a state
actor at the outset of the analysis.4 There was no question under the
facts of Gay Law Students in determining whether or not the California
equal protection clause applied to private actors.
Additionally, the lead opinion cites Jones v. Kmart Corp.75 for the
premise that the constitutional search and seizure provisions apply only
against state actors, despite the absence of a clear textual indication.
However, the main issue in Jones was not interpreting the state
constitutional provision.77 Jones considered whether a state statute
removed the constitutional state action requirement for purposes of
awarding tort damages resulting from violating a person's constitutional
rights. It was the civil code, not the constitution, at issue in Jones. Even
if Jones stood for a state action requirement in the search and seizure
provision, the language of article 1 section 13 is not analogous to article 1
section 2. Section 13 guarantees the "right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects" against unreasonable searches and
seizures.7 9 The next clause of the same sentence requires a warrant for
such searches and seizures to be issued only with probable cause.80
Issuing a warrant is undoubtedly state action. The requirement of state
action in the search and seizure provision is clear in the text. It takes no
implication to find a state action requirement. Jones is unpersuasive as
support for the lead opinion's argument that other provisions of the state
constitution have been construed as requiring state action without such
limiting language.
In addition to state constitutional jurisprudence, the lead opinion
dealt with directly contrary dictum in a recent free speech case. In
November 2000, Justice Mosk wrote the opinion in Gerawan Farming
Inc. v. Lyons."' In Gerawan, a plum farmer objected to a state plum
marketing program that required him to contribute to a state mandated
advertising campaign.' The plaintiff argued that being required to fund
a marketing program to which he would not ordinarily contribute
violated his free speech rights.83 The California Supreme Court agreed
73. 595 P.2d 592, 597 (Cal. 1979).
74. See id.
75. 949 P.2d 941 (Cal. 1998).
76. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 803.
77. Jones, 949 P.2d at 943.
78. Id.
79. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
80. Id.
81. 12 P.3d 720 (Cal. 2000).
82. Id. at 728.
83. Id.
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that while the First Amendment was not implicated, the plaintiff was
protected under California's broader free speech protections. Although
the defendant in the action was the California Secretary of Food and
Agriculture, undeniably a state actor, Justice Mosk, in tracing the history
of California free speech, stated: "It runs against the world ... as well as
governmental actors.""' Because this statement bore no weight in the
holding of the case, the lead opinion in Golden Gateway merely
identified it as dictum and dismissed it. 6
Finally the lead opinion examined holdings of other states when
faced with similar issues." Many states have rejected the Robins holding
even though their state constitutional provisions are worded similarly to
California's. Arizona, Illinois, Iowa, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, and others have embraced the state action requirement in
interpreting their free speech provisions& Like its sister-states,
California seems ready to assert that the right of free speech is not
enforceable against anyone other than state actors.
Based on the New York Constitution's legislative history and the
decisions of sister-states, the lead opinion found that the free speech
clause required state action before its protections can be invoked.
Because of the weight of stare decisis, necessarily the scope of what is
considered "state action" must encompass the holding of Robins. In
marrying the requirement of state action to the established precedent of
Robins, the court looked back to the basis for the holding in Robins. As
Chief Justice George stressed in his concurrence, the Robins court placed
heavy emphasis on the fact that the Pruneyard Shopping Center was
freely open to the public for a variety of activities.s9 These uses gave the
shopping center the functional equivalence of a downtown or central
business district.9
The public character of the property persuaded the court to extend
free speech protections on private Rlroperty where the public was
specifically invited to access it freely. Reminiscent of the principles
articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Marsh v. Alabama,2
the lead opinion articulated a broader rule of law: "[T]he actions of a
private property owner constitute state action for the purposes of
California's free speech clause only if the property is freely and openly
accessible to the public." 93 Therefore, the California Constitution is only
84. Id. at 751.
85. Id. at 735.
86. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001).
87. Id. at 801-02.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 809-10.
90. Id. at 809.
91. Id.
92. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (a company town was held to be tantamount to a municipality, therefore
the private street was deemed a public space and the First Amendment protections were applicable).
93. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 810.
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implicated where the nature of the private property is essentially public.
If property is freely open to the public, that property owner would be
deemed a state actor and the speaker could assert his or her state
constitutional rights.
C. The Concurrence
Although Chief Justice George agreed with the lead opinion that
the California Constitution was not implicated in this case, he preferred
to resolve the issue on other grounds than "state action."94 Just as the
lead opinion looked to New York's constitutional and legislative history,
Chief Justice George looked to a New York case for guidance under
these facts. 95 In Watchtower Bible & Tract Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., the New York Court of Appeals ruled that in high-
rise apartment buildings the Jehovah's Witnesses had no constitutional
right to come into the interior hallways and distribute unsolicited
pamphlets to the tenants.96  Although much of the New York court's
discussion centered on recent Supreme Court free speech decisions,
including Marsh v. Alabama, ultimately the court determined that there
was no constitutional question, either state or federal, under the facts of
the case. 97 "[N]o case we know of extends the reach of the Bill of Rights
so far as to proscribe the reasonable regulation, by an owner, of conduct
inside his multiple dwelling."9  Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, extending the reach of the First Amendment onto quasi-public
spaces, did not change the rule of New York as applied to inner hallways
of apartment buildings.9  "[T]he Constitution does not guarantee [the
pamphleteer] to go freely onto private property for such purposes.""
Just as New York's Justice Desmond found that there was no free
speech issue in Metropolitan Life, Chief Justice George felt that the
circumstances set before the court in Golden Gateway did not provide
the proper vehicle to clarify Robins. °1 Under these facts, he found the
state action doctrine irrelevant."" The state action issue was not on point
because the Complex is not "open to the general public."" 3 Robins and
its progeny all involve locales where the general public was freely invited
for a purpose, either specific to a stand-alone retail outlet or a complex
of retail outlets. 1°4 Because Robins only applied to circumstances where
94. Id. at 812 (George, C.J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. 79 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1948).
97. Id. at 436.
98. Id. at 436-37.
99. Id. at 436.
100. Id. at 435 (citing People v. Bohnke, 38 N.E.2d 478,479 (N.Y. 1941)).
101. See Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 816 (George, C.J., concurring).
102 Id. at 815.
103. Id. (emphasis omitted).
104. See, e.g., Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (1999) (stand-alone
grocery store); Allred v. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530 (1993) (medical building); Bank of Stockton v.
Church of Soldiers of the Cross of Christ, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 429 (1996) (bank parking lot).
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the general public is freely invited onto private property, and this is not
the case in the "interior hallways of privately owned apartment buildings
or ... in any other analogous area that is closed to the general public,"T
the free speech clause of the California Constitution was simply
inapplicable to the Golden Gateway circumstances.'O° "A free speech
right to distribute unsolicited pamphlets in places oen to the general
public is simply not triggered on the facts of this case."07
By making such a sweeping pronouncement that before the
constitutional free speech protections can apply state interference is
required, the Chief Justice determined the lead opinion simply went too
far:' °
By proposing to reach the state action issue, and by speaking broadly
and asserting that as a general matter, section 2(a) can afford no type
of free speech right with regard to a forum that is both privately owned
and closed to the general public, the lead opinion says more than it
needs to, and more than is supported by our prior decisions.0 9
The Chief Justice was not willing to impose constitutional free
speech guarantees on such a clearly private situation.
D. The Dissent
In her dissent, in which Justice Kennard and Judge Klein, sitting pro
tem, joined, Justice Werdegar found no reason to delve into legislative
history, the jurisprudence in construing other state constitutional
provisions, or similar decisions of other states. The dissent found that
the plain language of the state constitution was clear. The first sentence
of the free speech clause is unambiguous in its application to private
parties: "[E]very person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects.'" The second sentence of the clause forbids
the legislature from abridging free speech, specifying a second protection
in its plain language."' There was no need to construe one phrase against
the other, but simply to read the words as written. The text of the
California free speech provision protects speech from interference from
both private actors by virtue of the first phrase and from state actors in
the second."
2
Based on the plain language of the provision, the dissent argued that
Robins did not omit the state action requirement from its analysis, but
implicitly had to address it to reach a conclusion."3 The shopping
center's regulation that limited free speech was private action. By
105. See Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 812.
106. Id. at 815.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 816.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 817 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2, subd. (a)).
111. Id. at 818.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 818-19.
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holding that the state constitution was applicable in this situation, the
court necessarily held that the state constitution did not require state
action to enforce the free speech provision. 114
The dissent attacked the position taken by the lead opinion and
concurrence by arguing that the facts in this case did trigger a
constitutional analysis. The lead opinion's finding that the second
sentence of the free speech clause indicated the framer's intent to protect
only against state action in the entire provision was "neither logically nor
grammatically supportable.""' 5  The textualist interpretation of the
provision found no ambiguity in the plain English used by the framers.'
1 6
In support of this view, the dissent also traced the history of the
California Constitution, not by reviewing legislative history, but by
looking at how the structure and language of the free speech provision
appeared in different iterations of the state constitution."' Noting that
the legislature gave the provision some attention when it moved the free
speech guarantee from article I, section 9 to article I, section 2, but did
not change the core language of the phrase, this indicated that the
legislature found no ambiguity in the text or intent of the phrases."8 This
supports the conclusion that the free speech protection runs against both
public and private actors." 9 The dissent found it unnecessary to resort to
New York constitutional legislative history because the plain language of
the California Constitution is clear 20 There was no reason to change the
course of traditional jurisprudence on the state free speech issue from
the legacy left by Justice Mosk. 2 ' The plain language of the constitution
affords a single result-both public and private actors are subject to its
free speech protections.
The dissent rejected the premise that the Robins decision was based
on the public character of the shopping center.122  According to the
dissent, Robins was based not on the functional equivalence to a public
forum, but on the fact that the reasonable exercise of free speech did not
interfere with the property owner's use of the property nor dilute his
property rights.2" The dissent balanced the constitutional interests
according to Robins, the standing jurisprudence on the subject. The
reasonable exercise of free speech by the GGTA should be weighed
114. See id. at 819.
115. Id. at 824.
116. Id. at 825.
117. See id. at 825-26.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 827.
121. In addition to Gerawan, Mosk authored a dissenting opinion in Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d
460 (Cal. 1974), in which the majority held that the California free speech provision did not apply in a
private shopping center. Mosk's dissent arguably paved the way for the Robins decision that reversed
Diamond.




against the role of the Complex, the Owner's rights and any less intrusive
means for the Owner to achieve his or her ends.
Under this analysis, the dissent considered whether the ban on
leafleting was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on free
speech. Although respondents argued that the GGTA could use the
postal service, leaflet on the public sidewalks outside the buildings, and
post their information in laundry rooms, the dissent found none of these
methods as effective as distributing the material door-to-door."' The
mails require the cost of postage; those who do not use the laundry
rooms or enter the building via the front door would not receive the
leaflets."' Additionally, the respondent's arguments for enforcing the
ban were unconvincing. 26 The Owner justified the ban on leafleting to
prevent litter and address security concerns.127 The dissent took special
note that the GGTA had offered to remove any leaflets found in
hallways within twenty-four hours, which would address litter concerns.
No security incidents related to GGTA's leafleting activities had been
reported.12 Based on this evidence, an all out ban was not a reasonable
time, place, and manner restriction because there was no clear nexus
between the regulation and the purported goals of the regulation.""
It is apparent that the ACLU and the appellant's arguments were
persuasive to the dissenting justices. They recognized that the ban on
leafleting would have prevented effective communication in the
apartment community. 3' Free speech among neighbors and the tenants'
property rights tipped the balance "in favor of the right to voice ideas as
opposed to the mere naked title of the owners."'32 The dissent opined
that since the state constitution protects free speech of persons rightly on
private property, the leafleting activity of the GGTA should be
constitutionally protected.
33
III. The Current Approach
Though there was an attempt to clarify Robins, the decision in
Golden Gateway demonstrated how severely polarized even the
California Supreme Court is on this issue. Both the dissent and the lead
opinion use the text of the California Constitution to support opposite
interpretations. Each gave weight to favorable dicta, while dismissing
124. Id. at 821-22.
125. Id.
126. See id.




131. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California in support of
Golden Gateway Tenants Association at 5, Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants
Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (2001) (No. S081900).




contrary commentary. While it is not uncommon for justices to disagree,
the California Supreme Court is at odds over this issue. Fortunately, the
Chief Justice articulated an intent to clarify the state action issue, but on
a set of facts more suited to a natural extension of current case law. As
the Chief Justice pointed out so clearly, the facts of the case did not
provide an appropriate vehicle for deciding whether state action should
be a threshold requirement for an action of infringement of state
constitutionally guaranteed free speech.
3 4
A. The Law After Golden Gateway
Under the rule of law articulated by the plurality and the Chief
Justice in Golden Gateway, the Complex was not subject to the state
constitutional free speech protections because its residential buildings
were not freely accessible by the public.35 Where private property has
restricted access, limitations on constitutional protections can be
imposed in favor of the private property owner's interest in exercising
control over his or her property.' There is, however, no clearly
articulated line between how open is open enough to apply the state
constitutional protections.
In the wake of Golden Gateway, lower courts dealing with the issue
of free speech on private property have a hybrid standard to apply to
specific facts. First, the Golden Gateway decision requires an
examination of the "open" character of the private property in question.
Next, a court must apply the Robins balancing test, which looks at the
interference of the use of the private property and the property owner's
interest in excluding free speech, versus the societal interest of those
wishing to exercise freedom of expression on that property.
This two-prong analysis has moved from an ad hoc balancing test to
a definitional balancing standard. As opposed to the multifactor ad hoc
balancing test put forth by Robins, California law now has "identif[ied]
those limited situations in which speech is permitted on private property
as a matter of [state] constitutional law.""' First the property must meet
the definition of "freely and openly accessible to the public.",3 If so, a
court must weigh the factors of public interest in speech against the
property owner's interest, and whether alternative means for the speech
are available under the Robins balancing test. If the speech is not
protected by the constitution because it does not meet the openness
standard, this may be an area in which the state needs to legislate a
solution.3 9 Based on the polarized positions of the court on the state
action issue, in a shopping center setting, the definitional balancing
model seems to strike a reasonable compromise. But, as discussed in
134. Id. at 815 (George, C.J., concurring).
135. Id. at 823.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 810, 815.
139. See Pruning Pruneyard, supra note 30, at 1114.
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Part IV, infra, it offers far too little protection in a setting like Golden
Gateway Center.
B. Applying Golden Gateway
The first of the cases to apply the Robins/Golden Gateway
definitional balancing standard was Costco Co. v. Gallant, decided
February 27, 2002.40 Like Waremart and Raley's,"' this case also dealt
with the right of persons collecting signatures on private property. 142 In
order to protect their business operations and the safety of its patrons,
Costco instituted regulations on the number and frequency of expressive
activities. '43 Petition signature collectors brought suit claiming these
regulations infringed on their state constitutional right of free speech. '"
The appellate court began its analysis with the traditional reprise of
Robins and its balancing test, as well as subsequent jurisprudence in
other appellate courts, including Harris and Trader Joe's, both of which
supported the interests of the property owner over the interests of the
persons wishing to exercise free speech on their property.
The appellate court then reviewed the three opinions of the Golden
Gateway decision. While separately each opinion held limited
precedential value, the agreement between the concurrence and the lead
opinion that "expressive activity may be prohibited on private property
where access has been restricted" tipped the balance in favor of the
private property owner.1 46 Golden Gateway supports the application of
the holdings in Harris and Trader Joe's under these facts: because the
Costco store was not freely open to the public, but only available for a
limited purpose, the property owner's interest in exercising control over
his property prevailed. The first hurdle of the definitional balancing
approach was not cleared, therefore there was no reason to consider the
speech in a state constitutional context.
IV. Problems and Solutions
A. What's So Bad About a State Action Requirement?
More and more in our modern society, traditional areas of
government control have been given over to private ingenuity and
efficiency: private gated communities with common elements owned and
operated by an association or developer, charter schools run by a private
140. Costco Co., v. Gallant, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344 (Ct. App. 2002), cert. denied, S105758 2002 Cal.
LEXIS 3824 (June 12, 2002).
141. After the Golden Gateway decision state supreme court review of both cases was dismissed
and the cases were remanded to the appellate courts. Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc.,
45 P.3d. 1161 (Cal. 2002); Young v. Raley's, Inc. 45 P.3d 1162 (Cal. 2002).
142. Costco, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 346.
143. Id. at 346-47.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 347-50.
146. Id. at 355.
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company, water systems owned by private utilities, entire self-sufficient
communities ensconced in private, high-rise buildings. As private
companies exercise more control over an individual's life-control
traditionally held by an accountable representative government-
appropriate checks on abuse of this authority must be established.
1 47
Unlike the government, which is accountable to its electorate, private
companies have no direct accountability to the public, apart from
statutory constraints. 41 Indirect accountability to the public is found in
the marketplace, but when choice is limited, as in utilities, large regional
employers, or corporate landlords, economic accountability is minimal.
Under the limits of a state action requirement, huge segments of people's
lives would be lived without the protection of either the federal or the
state constitution. "When we privatize control over people's lives we
must protect constitutional values against private control."
The court would fail to recognize the realities of modern living were
it to adopt the state action doctrine, thereby limiting the application of
the free speech clause only to situations where the property was freely
and openly accessible to the public. Although state action might be a
legitimate starting place in analyzing constitutional issues, a better way of
looking at the state action issue is to ask: "Does a sufficient societal
interest exist to justify extending constitutional restraints to private
activity?"'"5 I would argue that Golden Gateway demonstrates there is.
(1) The State Action Requirement Changes Property Rights
The state and federal constitutional rights to own and hold property
have helped define American society. With ownership comes a bundle
of property rights including the right to own, to possess, to alienate all or
part of an interest in the property, the right to limit access and activity on
one's property, and the right to use one's property for economic benefit.
One of the most essential of these rights is the right to exclude others
from our property. In fact the U.S. Supreme Court has declared the right
to exclude as so fundamental a right it cannot be taken away without
compensation. ' However, a right cannot be taken away if it is freely
given.
In a situation like the one in Golden Gateway, a private property
owner freely and voluntarily alienated part of the right to possess its
private property to another by granting tenancies to its lessees. The
Owner voluntarily gave up its right to exclude those lessees from its
147. Jennifer Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply
Against Private Actors?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111, 111 (1989).
148. Id. at 127 & n.57.
149. Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedoms and Enrichment of Democracy:
Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 689, 690.
150. Scott E. Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution?, 17
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 150 (1989),
151. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979); see also Laura T. Rahe, The Right to
Exclude: Preserving the Autonomy of the Homeowners' Association, 34 URBAN LAW. 521, 546-50
(2002).
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property. California jurisprudence recognized that when a property
owner chooses to limits its own right to exclude there can be little
infringement on that right by allowing those permitted to be present to
exercise their constitutional right to free speech.'52 In imposing a state
action requirement to this situation, the court changes the terms of the
deal. A property owner can grant a tenancy to a lessee, yet maintain
absolute control over the speech that takes place while the property is in
possession of another. A state action limitation would change the
property right purchased by the tenant into a mere permitted use and
marginalize the property interest he or she bargained for in good faith.
This assertion is demonstrated by looking at the fundamental
differences between the Golden Gateway and the case on which Chief
Justice George rested his concurring opinion-Watchtower Bible & Tract
Society, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.'53 That case and
Golden Gateway have certain similarities-both include leafleting in the
interior hallways of a privately owned, high-rise apartment building. But
that is where the similarities end. In Golden Gateway, tenants with a pre-
existing right to be on the premises wished to communicate with
neighbors. In Metropolitan Life, outside proselytizers wished to enter
the building for the purposes of spreading their message door to door.
This difference is a crucial one. In one case the building owners sought
to protect themselves and tenants from outside solicitation; all those with
a property interest were served by this ruling. In the other, the owners
sought to keep the tenants themselves from speaking. The fee simple,
though non-possessory, property interest was allowed to trump the lease
interest in the same property at the expense of state constitutional
guarantees.
(2) State Action and Alternative Neighborhoods
While the lead opinion in Golden Gateway would define state action
to exist where property is "freely and openly accessible to the public," '55
the lead opinion reinforced much of the confusing language of Robins:
"freely open to the public,"' 156 "an unrestricted invitation to...
congregate freely,"' 5 7 "freely and openly accessible to the public,"'5"8
"unrestricted access to ... privately owned property,' '59  "private
property [that is] public in character." A secure residential apartment
building is clearly none of these things.
152. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (1979), aff'd, 444 U.S. 74 (1980);
Diamond v. Bland, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970); In re Hoffman, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).
153. 79 N.E.2d 433 (N.Y. 1948).
154. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 798.
155. Id. at 810.
156. Id. at 809.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 810.
159. Id. at 809.
160. Id. at 810.
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The lead and concurring opinions decline to squarely address
another view of "freely open and accessible"-the main point briefed by
the appellant, GGTA. The GGTA saw its role in distributing pamphlets
as directly analogous to the students in Robins.6' Because the shopping
center was open to the public upon invitation by the private property
owner, the students had every right to be present at the shopping
center. "[T]he [Robins] decision stands for the proposition that once
the individuals are rightfully on a particular premises, those individuals
have certain free speech rights on those premises.', 6 3  Similarly, the
GGTA was made up of tenants of the apartment buildings, who have not
just an invitation, but also a contractual and property right to be on the
premises.' 64 The GGTA was not an outsider attempting to distribute
unrelated leaflets to tenants, it was an organization made up of residents
with vested concerns about their neighborhood.6 By allowing a private
owner to forbid the free distribution of information, a community was
being denied the freedom to speak with other members in that
community.166 In its amicus brief the ACLU also stressed that limiting
the speech of residents within their own community was not only
contrary to the spirit of the California Constitution, it diluted the tenants'
property rights.'
The GGTA espoused a broader right to speech than the one this
Note proposes. Allowing anyone with any right to be on the property to
exercise constitutional free expression may well unduly infringe on the
right of the private property. However, the modern apartment building
is the only option for many people seeking to live in an urban setting.
The common areas and hallways are often the urban alternative to a
traditional neighborhood. Imposing a state action requirement on the
right to free speech allows a private landlord to determine the
boundaries of a tenant's constitutional rights, virtually unchecked.
161. Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits at 4, Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (No. S081900).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 6.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 4.
166. Id.
167. Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California in Support of
Golden Gateway Tenants Association at 5-6, Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants
Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (2001) (No. S081900) (citing Van Nuys Publ'g Co. v. City of Thousand Oaks, 5 Cal.
3d 817 (1971)).
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(3) The State Action Requirement Is Contrary to California Public Policy
California has repeatedly stated that the right to free expression is
not limited to governmental actors.t'6  This reflected a consistent
constitutional interpretation that did not narrowly construe the liberty of
free speech rights. As noted in Part II, supra, Justice Mosk's statement
in Gerawan Farming was non-binding dictum. However, the statement
reflected the court's attitude regarding California's constitutional right of
free speech. The sudden reversal in policy in Golden Gateway without a
clearly compelling reason or set of facts troubled the dissent. Any
question left open by the rule of Robins, the dissent argued, was put to
rest by the very dictum in Gerawan that the lead opinion summarily
dismissed. Unfortunately, arguing that dictum in Robins, which stated
that the court declined to address "the property or privacy rights of an
individual homeowner or the proprietor of a modest retail
establishment,"170 is clarified by dictum in Gerawan, which stated that the
California free speech protection "runs against the world, including
private actors as well as governmental actors, ""' fails to grant either one
the power of stare decisis. However, these statements did illustrate the
policy position of the court at the time those decisions were published.
Free speech under the California Constitution was celebrated
because it received broader protection than under the First Amendment.
The lead opinion admits that free speech jurisprudence has suffered
"no... ill effects" from Robins or its progeny. The lead opinion
likewise presented no compelling reasons for the court to change the
value it places on the right to speak freely. Until such facts present an
urgent need to revisit the public policy that stands behind Robins, there
is no need to radically alter California's protective policy regarding the
right to free speech.
B. State Action and the New Jersey Lesson
The ultimate rule of law in Golden Gateway created different sets of
constitutional free speech rights based on property ownership, as
opposed to tenancy. Instead of focusing on the relationship of the
proponent of speech to the private property owner and the private
property where they wished to exercise this right, the majority of court
focused only on the nature and character of the property. This is where
both state action and the Robins balancing test are incomplete. In a
situation where a person wishes to exercise free speech on private
property there is necessarily a three part dynamic. First, the court needs
to consider the rights and obligations of the citizen wishing to exercise his
168. See supra note 152; Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720 (2000); see also Friesen,
supra note 147, at 113-14.
169. See also Friesen, supra note 147, at 121-22.
170. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
171. Gerawan, 12 P.3d at 735.
172. Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001).
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or her right. Second, the court must consider the nature of facility where
the proponent wishes to speak. Finally, the court must consider the
interests of the property owner. By excluding the identity of the speaker
from the analysis, the court necessarily omitted from constitutional
protection those holding less than a fee interest in otherwise private
property. By approaching the free speech clause from this angle,
tenants' associations, employee organizations, and private tenants may
not assert the California free speech provision as a shield against those
who would suppress their expressive activities. The individuals and
organizations are left with only the protection afforded them under
property law.173  Unfortunately, neither state statutes nor local
ordinances offer much protection for associations wishing to distribute
leaflets in an apartment complex setting.
1 74
Neither a state action limitation nor the Robins balancing test
adequately serves California. Although the lead opinion rested part of
its support on the jurisprudence of other states, it hastily dispensed with
New Jersey Supreme Court decisions that insightfully dealt effectively
with similar issues. The New Jersey Constitution's free speech clause is
quite similar to California's. It states, "Every person may freely speak,
write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the
liberty of speech or of the press. . . .,,17 Although the holdings of a sister-
state are not binding on California, the practical logic of the decisions are
well worth noting.
In State v. Schmid, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a
person not affiliated with Princeton University nevertheless had the state
constitutional right to speak and hand out pamphlets on university
property, even though it was privately owned. 17  The court enunciated
173. Id. at 811.
174. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Appellant at 12, Golden
Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (No. S081900). (Several
amicus briefs referred to parties as they were captioned at the appellate court level. The Pacific Legal
Foundation filed its brief in support of the Plaintiff and Respondent, Golden Gateway Center, Inc.)
There are provisions for residents of mobile home parks to canvass, distribute materials, and organize
tenants' association, but no other statutory provision outside of the mobile home park setting.
The only statutory provisions closely applicable to this situation, where resident-organizers wish
to communicate with neighbors to form a building association, are found in California Civil Code
sections 1942.5 and 1942.6. California Civil Code section 1942.5 prohibits a landlord from retaliating
against tenants for participating in a tenant's association. California Civil Code section 1942.6 states
that organizers entering private property to organize tenants are not guilty of criminal trespass. There
is clearly a legislative policy in favor of tenant associations. It makes no sense that that there is
legislation permitting outside people to enter a building in order to organize tenants, but no
commensurate right for tenants living within the private property to organize themselves.
175. N.J. CONST. art. I, 6. California's free speech guarantee states, "[e]very person shall have
the right to freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for
the abuse of that right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 2, subdiv. (a).
176. 423 A.2d 615, 633 (N.J. 1980).
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three factors to determine when the state free speech guarantee attached
to expression on private property:
(1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such private property,
generally, its "normal" use, (2) the extent and nature of the public's
invitation to use that property, and (3) the purpose of the expressional
activity undertaken upon such property in relation to both the private
and public use of the property.
In a later case, the court further explained the relationship of the
three elements delineated in Schmid:
This "multi-faceted" standard determines whether private property
owners "may be required to permit, subject to suitable restrictions, the
reasonable exercise by individuals of the constitutional freedoms of
speech and assembly." That is to say, they determine whether, taken
together, the normal uses of the property, the extent of the public's
invitation, and the purpose of free speech in relation to the property's
use result in a suitability for free speech on the property that on
balance, is sufficiently compelling to warrant limiting the private
property owner's right to exclude it; a suitability so compelling as to be• • • 178
constitutionally required.
Like Robins did implicitly, this approach necessarily rejects a state
action requirement and takes a balancing approach to private property
rights vis-A-vis free speech rights.1 79 For this reason the Golden Gateway
lead opinion rejected the approach for the New Jersey courts out of
hand: "[T]he New Jersey Supreme Court has declined to impose a state
action limitation on the free speech clause of New Jersey's Constitution.
Therefore, New Jersey decisions are not relevant to our interpretation of
the California Constitution. ' ' 80
The lead opinion did a disservice by ignoring the relevant analysis
by a sister-state that so closely tracked California public policy and free
speech jurisprudence. First, the test applied by the New Jersey Court
clarifies and narrows the less-than-helpful balancing test enunciated in
Robins, but maintains the same goals-broad protection for speech,
where it is appropriate. Second, the goals expressed by the New Jersey
court are similar to the public policy goals expressed in Gerawan and
Robins-to protect Californians from unreasonable infringement on
their right to speak freely by private parties. The tripartite test
effectively does this while respecting the fundamental rights of private
177. Id. at 630.
178. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, Inc., 650 A.2d 757,
760-61 (N.J. 1994) (citing Schmid, 423 A.2d at 630); see Guttenberg Taxpayers & Rentpayers Ass'n v.
Galaxy Towers Condominium Ass'n, 688 A.2d 156,158 (N.J. Super. 1996).
179. See New Jersey Coalition Against War, 650 A.2d at 771:
In this case, we continue to explore the extent of our State Constitutional right of free
speech. We reach the same conclusion we did in Schmid: the State right of free speech is
protected not only from abridgement by government, but also from unreasonably restrictive
and oppressive conduct by private entities.
See also Golden Gateway Ctr., Inc. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 29 P.3d 797, 819 (Cal. 2001)
(Werdegar, J., dissenting).
180. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 811.
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property owners. A state action requirement, however, serves none of
these goals. A state action requirement sacrifices the rights of the
proponent of speech in favor of a property owner, no matter how
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair the limitation.
C. The Proposed Solution
Instead of imposing a state action requirement in order to have a
justiciable constitutional claim for infringement of the right of free
expression, I suggest a two-tier test. First, a legally enforceable right to
be present on the property should grant the speaker constitutional
protection. If no such right exists the court should balance the
relationship of the speaker to the property, the property's normal or
customary use, and the extent to which the public is invited or permitted
to use the property.
(1) A Present Possessory Interest in the Property Grants the Speaker a
State Constitutional Right to Free Speech
A property owner may voluntarily compromise his absolute right to
exclude. When a property owner grants another person or group a
license to be on the property, he voluntarily limits his absolute right to
exclude the licensees from his private property. When a private property
owner grants another a present possessory interest, she voluntarily limits
her own access to the property in favor of those with the possessory
interest. If an owner leases a business or residential unit to another, that
tenant has a legal right to enjoyment of the property free from undue
landlord interference for a defined period of time.
As was argued in Golden Gateway, the tenants' organization had a
legal right to be on the property because each member had a lease or
other similar tenancy in the apartment. That tenancy gives a tenant a
legal interest in the property, subject to the terms of their rental or lease
agreement that may limit their use of the unit and activities on the
premises. However, that agreement should not be used by the landlord
to substantially limit the free exercise by tenants of their guaranteed
constitutional rights. Thus, those with a present possessory interest in
the property should have the right to speak freely as permitted by the
California Constitution. Having a present possessory and legally
enforceable property right, the tenants should have a right to exercise
free speech just as a fee simple owner would in his or her home or
neighborhood. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech will limit any perceived potential disruptions of the use of the
property caused by tenant speech.
Closer questions arise in the context of lesser possessory interests.
With easements, a property owner has not relinquished a present
possessory interest, unlike in a periodic tenancy or greater estate, but has
merely granted a concurrent right to another party to be present on the
property for a specified use. Easements granted for utility lines, rights of
way, public trails, and other access issues would require a court to look at
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the nature of the enforceable legal interest of the proponent of the
speech to be present on the property and determine if the expression had
a nexus with that right, under the second tier of the legal test, below.
(2) When Less Than a Present Possessory Interest in the Property
Exists, the Court Must Consider Three Factors
I suggest that New Jersey's tri-factor approach' 8' is sound and
logical, and it supports California's underlying public policy in supporting
free speech. The second step of the analysis applies in two ways: first, to
interests granted by a property owner to a third party where the property
owner has not relinquished his or her present possessory interest, but
rather maintains concurrent uses of the property; and, second, to those
would-be speakers with no interest in the property, e.g., the public,
employees, etc.
Contracts between a property owner and the proponent of speech
might also give rise to constitutionally guarantees. Contracts limited to
particular endeavors and/or agreements of a limited duration probably
will not present such sticky questions, however. Because contracts define
access for limited purposes, any permitted free speech activity may be
defined and governed by the contract. If the contract is silent, as
discussed below, in order to be constitutionally protected there must be
some relationship between the speech, the property, and the public use
of the property. As with easements, the court should apply this three-
part test to determine if an exercise of constitutionally protected speech
is appropriate.
In this phase of the analysis, the court considers the nature, purpose
and primary use of the property; the extent of the public's invitation to
use the property; and the relationship of the speech to the forum.
(a) The Nature, Purposes, and Primary Use of the Private Property
In Prisoner's Union v. Dept. of Corrections, then appellate court
judge Joseph Grodin enunciated a test to determine when the right of
free speech was enforceable for expressive activities on government
owned property. '  If "there is a basic incompatibility between a
communication and the primary activity of an area," the expressive
activity may be proscribed.'83 This analysis was limited to publicly owned
property, where the state's actions limited speech.' 84 While not directly
applicable to the private property context, it does provide us with an
outer framework from which to work, based on California law.
By determining if an expressive use is incompatible we must
determine if the speech activity prevents regular commercial or private
181. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, Inc., 650 A.2d 757,
760-61 (1984); see also State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630 (N.J. 1980).
182. See 185 Cal. Rptr. 634, 637 (Cal. App. 1982).
183. Id. (emphasis omitted).
184. See id. at 638-39.
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use of the property.8' If it impedes those uses it is incompatible. With
public property, arguably each itizen has a constitutionally guaranteed
right to use the property so long as their use does not interfere with the
functioning of the public entity using the property."' However, private
property rights are more expansive. The right to exclude is one of the
most valued in the bundle of property rights."8 Therefore, it is not
enough to see if a use is incompatible; we must determine if the
expressive activity would be considered normal use of the property.
For instance, a large manicured lawn may be suitable for an anti-war
sit-in; however, if it is a person's front yard, a sit-in is not its "normal
use.""' Similarly, if a property is single-family residential, leafleting by
the public on the front law is not the primary use of the private property.
This activity is not considered a normal use of the private property, and
is therefore incompatible.
(b) The Extent and Nature of the Public's Invitation to Use the Property
As discussed in Robins and Golden Gateway's lead and concurring
opinions, factors such as "freely open to the public,"'89 "functional
equivalence [of the property] to a traditional public forum,"'9
"unrestricted invitation to the public to congregate freely,'"' 9' and "if the
property is freely and openly accessible to the public"'192 are factors that
should be considered. This invitation need not be expressly stated, but
might be implied by previous uses, or attempts by the owner to curtail
some uses. For instance, in Costco, the court gave considerable weight to
the store's single purpose and the management's attempts to control the
conduct of signature collectors out of concern for its patrons and
employees. '  The Robins court also noted that people felt free to
congregate at the shopping center through welcoming advertising.9
(c) Relationship of the Type of Speech to the Forum
The relationship of the expression, its nature, content, and purpose,
as it relates to the property, is essential to determine the appropriateness
of the application of constitutional guarantees to free expression. For
185. See id. at 637.
186. See id.
187. See Allred v. Harris, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 533 (Cal. App. 1993) (citing Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982)).
188. In fact, if the sit-in is uninvited it may constitute a misdemeanor offense under California
Penal Code sections 602(l) ("Entering and occupying real property or structures of any kind without
the consent of the owner, the owner's agent or the person in lawful possession.") and 602(n)
("Refusing or failing to leave land, real property, or structures belonging to or lawfully occupied by
another and not open to the general public, upon being requested to leave by" a police officer, the
owner, or person lawfully in possession.).
189. Golden Gateway, 29 P.3d at 810.
190. Id. at 809.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 810.
193. See Costco Co. v. Gallant, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 352-55 (2000).
194. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979).
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example, a court may determine that employees may speak freely
regarding the facts and circumstances of their employment while on the
private employer's premises, subject to reasonable time, use and manner
restrictions. In the labor context it may be important for the court to
take note of the public policy of the state, as expressed through its case
law and statutes that tend to favor organized labor and workers' rights
over a property owner's absolute right to exclude.'9
E. Summary
The proposed solution to a state constitutional right to free speech
on private property would give a person who has been granted a present
possessory interest in the property a constitutionally guaranteed right of
free speech on that property. If there is no present possessory interest
held by the speaker, or if the possessory interest is concurrent with that
of the property owner, the court should move to the second prong of the
analysis. A property owner may place reasonable time, use, and manner
restrictions on speech, even for those with a present possessoryinterest.
If there is no legally enforceable possessory interest, the court must
consider the following factors to determine if the constitutional
guarantee attaches: (1) the nature, purposes, and primary use of such
private property, i.e., its "normal" use; (2) the extent and nature of the
public's invitation to use the property; and (3) the purpose of the
expressional activity as it relates to both the private and public use of the
property.'%
In Golden Gateway, had the state supreme court applied the above
standard to determine if the tenants had a right to leaflet in the common
areas that made up their urban neighborhood, the outcome would have
been different. The tenants would have a constitutionally guaranteed
right to free speech, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions to avoid undue disruption of the "neighborhood." However,
the tenants' association, as an entity, would not have the right to free
speech under the first tier of the test. The association, as an entity, had
no property interest in the Complex.
Under the second tier, which accommodates public-like spaces and
the relationship of the speaker to that property, it is not certain that the
association and its leafleting activities would have prevailed either.
While the nature and purpose of the Complex was residential and the
195. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(n) (misdemeanor trespass for failure to leave private
property not applicable to lawful union activities).
196. Professor Friesen, in her own review of New Jersey's and other states' free expression case
history, advocated a similar balancing approach;
While the lack of an invitation to the public surely is relevant when the entire public seeks
to enter, that observation hardly should dispose of the rights of particular members of the
public whose purposes for entering are both nondisruptive and highly related to the use of
the property.... At a minimum, the speaker's constitutional interest could be accommo-
dated when the financial cost to the defendant is low, and the defendant has no competing
constitutional interest of her own.
Friesen, supra note 147, at 135.
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public was not invited to use the property, the purpose of the leafleting
was to enhance communication among tenants and protect tenant
interests. The court would have to balance the strength of each factor to
determine the appropriate outcome.
The proposed standard would have allowed the Golden Gateway
Center tenants to craft their speech and organization to take advantage
of constitutional protections. While the proposed standard does not
grant extensive constitutional protections to free expression by tenants, it
goes far beyond current limits. This protection balances the property
owner's interest in controlling his property, while at the same time
protecting the constitutional rights of those with less than a fee simple
interest.
Conclusion
Because Robins failed to articulate whether state action was or was
not a factor in determining whether free speech was constitutionally
permitted on private property in California, scholarly debate has been
ongoing. Over the last twenty-plus years the courts have been able to
use the balancing test articulated in Robins with some consistency, but
the standard was far from clear outside of a retail setting. In 2001 the
California Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard. Three
dissenting members of the court preferred the broader speech
protections afforded by the balancing test, while three others signing on
to the lead opinion preferred to superimpose a state action requirement
before a state constitutional claim could be made. The Chief Justice
recognized the need for clarification in this area, but declined to endorse
a state action limitation under the facts of Golden Gateway.
Read together, the concurrence and the lead opinion clarified the
balancing test. Now, using a definitional balancing model, the courts
must determine whether the property in question is freely and openly
accessible to the public. If so, then the court will proceed to balance the
interests of free speech with the interests of the property owner, as
articulated in Robins. If the property is not freely open to the public,
there is no state constitutionally enforceable right to free speech on the
private property.
Both a state action requirement and the definitional balancing test
needlessly discriminate against those who have an enforceable property
interest in the private property in question, but whose interest is less than
total ownership. This limits the state constitutional right to free
expression only to those who own the property they possess. Those who
choose to rent, either by choice or circumstances, have no constitutional
right to expression in and about their residence or business. The legal
test proposed in this Note would protect the rights of property owners
without denying those holding lesser interests the right to speak in their
neighborhoods and businesses.
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